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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

RULON ROMRELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
13801

W. W. CLYDE AND COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant-appellant's statement is substantially accurate excepting as to how the animals got under the fence
at a cut made by defendant-appellant, as there was no evidence that the animals "crawled under the fence and the
jury found there was no acceptance of the work of the
defendant-appellant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant-appellant's statement as to the disposition is
accurate.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant's statement is correct with respect to
the relief sought on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-appellant's statement of facts is substantially
correct as far as it goes, but some salient facts are left out.
The fence in the general area of the cut in question was not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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completed by the contractor until long after the damage to
plaintiff-respondent (Tr. 62 - p. 44, lines 16-30; p. 45, lines
1-23), (Tr. 62 - p. 14, lines 15-30; p. 15, lines 1-18). At the
time the cow and the bull got out and died, the fence had
not been completed. The fence had not been fastened down
according to the plans and specifications and had been left
unfastened at the bottom (Tr. 62 - p. 34, lines 9-27). The
highway construction itself was not completed until long
after the damage to plaintiff-respondent (Tr. 61 - p. 42, lines
12-30, p. 43, lines 1-30, p. 44, lines 1-10).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE VERDICT OF
THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
THEREON.
The jury found under proper instructions from the court
that the defendant-appellant was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff-respondent. The jury found that the defendant-appellant
was negligent in either failing to fasten the fence, which would
be a failure to follow the specifications (Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines
25-30, p. 34, lines 1-11, and Tr. 61 - p . 21, lines 1-13, Tr. 61 p. 11, lines 3-10), or in failing to place an obstruction in the
cut under the fence, which any reasonable person would know
was necessary to prevent damage to the animals regardless of
whether such action was specified or not. Or the jury may
have determined the negligence of the defendant upon both
issues. The issue of contributory negligence raised by the defendant-appellant was determined by the jury against its
claims.
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POINT II
THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO DIG THE TRENCH UNDER
THE FENCE PURSUANT TO DIRECTIONS OF A STATE
EMPLOYEE, BUT IF IT DID SO IT DID IT NEGLIGENTLY
FOR WHICH IT SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE.
POINT III
THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL OR OTHER ACCEPTANCE
OF THE HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION WORK INCUMBENT
UPON THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHICH WOULD
INSULATE IT FROM LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT FOR HIS DAMAGES.
Inasmuch as the defendant-appellant treats the same subject matter under its Points I and II in its Brief as we would
treat under Points II and III, Points II and III are treated in
this Brief together.
The defendant-appellant cites the case of Black vs. Peter
Kiewit Son's Inc., 94 Idaho 755, 497, Pacific 2d 1056 (1972)
in support of its view that a contractor is not liable to a
third person where the contractor has performed its work in
accordance with its plans and specifications. In that case it
was stipulated that the respondent contractor had constructed
the whole highway section in accordance with the plans and
specifications, and that the State Highway Engineer had
accepted the work as completed. This case involved the
completion of a whole section of road and the acceptance
thereof by the proper state authority. How different that is
from the present case. It was pointed out by the court in the
Idaho case that at no time after the work was accepted by
the state did the contractor maintain or control such highway
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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section, but that responsibility was left with the state. In the
present case, the defendant-appellant didn't fasten the fence
in accordance with specifications (Tr. 62 - p. 34, lines 9-27),
(Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 25-30, and p. 34, lines 1-11). That is
what the jury believed and such belief was substantially supported by the evidence.
The defendant-appellant cites annotations in 13 A.L.R. 2d
195 and 58 A.L.R. 2d 869 to support its view that where the
contractor performs his work according to plans and specifications there may be no liability imposed upon him for
damage resulting from such construction. Interestingly, both
annotations are entitled "Negligence of building or construction contractor as ground for liability upon his part for injury or damage to third person occurring after completion
and acceptance of the work". It was further pointed out in
the annotations that they did not deal with the liability of
the contractor for negligence resulting in injury or damage
to third persons during the performance or progress of the
work. In examining the cases cited in the annotations, the
work involved and not just isolated parts thereof had been
completed and accepted by the owner. In the present case
there had been a fence constructed although later completed
long after the damage (Tr. 62 - p. 44, lines 16-30, p. 45, lines
1-23), (Tr. 62 - p. 14, lines 15-30, p. 15, lines 1-18). The
construction of the fence was one of the first things to be
done in a road construction job and an infinitesimal part of
the whole road job. None of the cases that the writer has
been able to find would imply an acceptance of a small part
of a highway construction job, when the contractor remains
in control.
The case of Haynes vs. Norfolk Bridge and Construction
Company, 126 Nebraska 281, 253 N.W. 344 (1934) cited by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendant-appellant involved a contract for the construction
of twin culverts. The evidence showed that the last work was
done upon that project by the defendant Norfolk Company
on the 18th of July 1930, and at that time the State's Project
Engineer and the foreman of the Norfolk Company together
estimated and agreed upon the yardage and the engineer in
his book kept for the purpose stated that the work was finished and completed, and a day or two after that the Norfolk
Company removed all of its equipment and entered upon
work of construction on another project several miles distant
from the scene of the twin culverts and upon an entirely
different contract. The Court pointed out that the record
disclosed that there was also a second contract between the
state and another contractor, the latter to do the work of
grading and servicing on the first project after the two culverts
were installed. The injury in this case occurred after the
total completion of the contract of the defendant and on or
about July 30, 1930. This case involved a total completion of
a contract and the acceptance by the state and the Court held
that the defendant contractor was insulated from liability
because of the acceptance after the total completion of the
job. That is not at all the case on appeal before this Court.
The case of Rengstorf vs. Winston Bros. Col, 167 Minn.,
290, 208 N.W. 995 (1926) cited by defendant-appellant
involved a situation where a grading contractor contracted to
construct certain grades but not to construct guard rails. The
injury occurred when an accident happened because no guard
rails were constructed. The construction of the guard rails
was not in any way the obligation of the contractor. The
Court pointed out that the defendant contractor's whole
contract had been completed and accepted prior to the injury and the contractor was insulated from liability.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The case of Reynolds vs. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S.W.
2d 714 (1954) also cited by defendant-appellant also involved another situation where the whole contract of the
defendant had been completed and accepted on May 22,
1951, and an injury occurred on October 27, 1951. The
State had had the responsibility for the upkeep and maintenance of the road long before the injury occurred.
The case of Leininger vs. Steams-Roger Manufacturing
Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33 (1965), also involved
a situation where there had been the completion of a contract
for the installation of a fan four years prior to an injury resulting from the dismantling and repair of an exhaust fan.
The fan had been constructed according to the instructions
of the employer of the independent contractor. The whole
contract for the installation of the fan had been completed
four years before according to the instructions of the employer. There was no claim in this case of any negligence on the
part of the defendant contractor. That case also is entirely
different form the facts of the present case where there was
a piecemeal construction of a fence by a contractor whose
responsibility it was to build a whole highway and whose
negligence was proved by the evidence.
The defendant has cited no cases or authorities supporting
the view that an acceptance or even an implied acceptance
can be effected piecemeal. In other words, to follow defendant's argument to. its logical conclusion, if ten feet of fence
on a highway project had been constructed by a contractor
on a road building contract just begun and the balance of a
mile of fence was changed and altered, then there would be
no liability on the part of a contractor if damage resulted
from the faulty construction of a ten-foot strip of fence
while the contractor was working on and was in control of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the highway job. That cannot be the law and the cases do not
support that view.
In the case Leininger vs. Steams-Roger Manufacturing Company», 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33 (1965) cited by defendantappellant, supra, this Court acknowledged its familiarity with
the old rule and the modern view. In that case, the Court
applied the modern view with the limitation that the contractor is not liable if he merely carried out the plans, specifications and directions given him, at least when the plans are not
so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow
them.
We submit that even under the doctrine of the Leininger
case, supra, and disregarding the fact that in that case there
had been an acceptance of the entire contract of the defendant four years before, and assuming the completion of the
entire highway project in the area by defendant-appellant
Clyde, the jury could have found for the plaintiff as it did
base on either of the two specifications of negligence, (1)
defendant-appellant's failure to fasten the fence pursuant to
specifications, and/or (2) failure to provide an obstruction in
the cut under the fence. If the jury's finding of negligence
was based on the failure to fasten the fence it was proper
because this would not be work done in accordance with the
plans and specifications. If the jury's finding of negligence
was based on defendant-appellant's failure to place an obstruction under the fence in the cut to prevent the animals
from going under the fence it was also proper. Even when
specifications are furnished, a contractor is not immune from
liability merely because he follows the specifications if his
work creates a situation which is so clearly dangerous that a
reasonable and prudent man would not simply leave the work
in a dangerous condition, which was the case here.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The jury was instructed that a verdict could not be returned against the defendant-appellant if the loss to the
animals occurred after the defendant-appellant had completed
its work on or about the fence and the same was accepted by
the state. That instruction was certainly more favorable to
the defendant-appellant than it should be. The jury did return
a verdict against the defendant and therefore had to have
found that the work was not completed and accepted before
the loss of the animals.
Whether or not the work was completed and accepted
before the animals died was clearly a question of fact and
since there was evidence produced on both sides of the issue,
it was properly submitted to the jury. Defendant-appellant's
argument, therefore, that the Court should have instructed,
as a matter of law, that there had been an acceptance of the
work is clearly erroneous. The issue, rather, is whether the
jury's finding is supported by the evidence.
Both of defendant-appellant's witnesses on the issue,
Lundell and Corless, testified that they had not accepted the
work and turned it over to the State (Tr. 61 - p. 43, lines
1-30, p. 44, lines 1-10). There was also testimony by Mr.
Corless that there was some work left for the contractor to do
on the fence after May 22, 1972, the date appellant alleges it
completed its final work on the fence (Tr. 61 - p. 36, lines
1-23).
In the rather extensive annotation in 38 A.L.R. 403 entitled "Personal liability of contractor in respect of injuries
sustained by persons other than the contractor during the
progress of the stipulated work" the general doctrine is stated
on pages 495-496 as follows:
"In this monograph it is proposed to review the cases
which illustrate the operation of the general doctrine
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that an independent contractor is responsible for any
wrongful acts that may be committed by himself or his
servants while the stipulated work is in progress. In
respect of the responsibility thus imposed upon him,
there is an essential difference between his position and
that of a servant.
"The ground upon which this responsibility is based is
the implied duty which the law casts upon him, as the
person in control of the work, to see that the rights of
other persons are not injuriously affected by its performance.
"The responsibility so imputed extends not only to the
work specified in the contract itself, but also to any
additional work which the contractor undertakes in
compliance with a direction given by the employer, acting in the exercise of a right expressly reserved in the
contract, or which he voluntarily agrees to execute in
pursuance of an agreement, while the contract is in
course of performance.
"The doctrine that the independent status of a contractor is not destroyed by the employer's reservation of a
right to exercise over the performance of the work a
degree of control which does not extend to direction in
respect of details obviously involves the corollary that a
contractor must answer for his own tortious acts and
those of his servants, although an agent was deputed by
the employer to superintend the work, and see that the
terms of the contract were complied with."
The work on the highway in the pertinent area had just
begun and the defendant-appellant is responsible for the
damages resulting.
POINT IV
THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR IS RESPONSIBLE TO
THE PLAINTIFF RESPONDENT FOR DAMAGES RESULTING TO PLAINTIFF BY REASON OF THE NEGDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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LIGENCE OF THE APPELLANT CONTRACTOR.
As shown by the previous argument and the authorities
cited by the defendant-appellant, the jury's verdict should
stand under the facts and the law. There is, however, a further
development in extending the doctrine advanced in the case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217N. Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F, 696. This extention is set forth so
vividly in the case of Tomchik, et al. v. Julian, et al, (California) 340 P. 2d 72, which says:
"The rule that a general contractor is not liable for injuries to third persons resulting from his negligence in
construction of the work after the work is completed
and accepted by the owner is no longer the law; the
modern tendency being to hold building contractor to
the general standard of reasonable care for the protection
of anyone who may reasonably be endangered by negligence even after acceptance of the work."
To the same effect are the law review articles in the following law reviews: 41 Tex. L. Rev. 599, (1963); 42 Va. L. Rev.
403 (1956); 43 Marq. L. Rev. 252 (1959); 15 Okl. L. Rev. 68
1962). Also, see annotation in 58 A.L.R. 2d 865.
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CONCLUSION
In any event, the appellant contractor in the case before
this Court should be held liable on any theory adopted because of the negligence of the defendant-appellant and because the injury occurred while the contractor was in full
control of the highway facility and long before it was completed and accepted and the verdict of the jury and Judgment
•entered thereon should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSEN, for
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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